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Abstract. The current decade brought a neo-authoritarian wave to the countries in CEE. This 
process, which in certain respects runs parallel to the populist upsurge in Western countries, has its 
own specificity. Firstly, by focusing on the clash between “elites” and “the people”, it rekindles – in 
a displaced, right-wing form – the class conflict which before 1989 was an ideological staple in CEE 
countries. Secondly, insofar as neo-authoritarianism in CEE has often a distinctly neo-liberal agenda 
shadowed by declarative anti-globalism and national chauvinism, it warps the field of political 
struggle. Thirdly, in the neo-authoritarian turn law becomes the crucial field of ideological fight, 
principally in those countries where populists came to power. In this respect, new governments in 
CEE resort to a blend of old Fascist tools (such as dismantling of constitutional control and denying 
the primacy of international law) and new inventions (such as the effective state of exception in 
some areas of law in Poland introduced in 2015–18). The role of critical jurisprudence in CEE is 
therefore particularly significant and difficult. The paper argues that liberal jurisprudence, although 
actively engaged in analysing neo-authoritarianism, does not possess adequate conceptual tools 
for full success. Therefore critical jurisprudence should urgently take part in explaining neo-
authoritarianism in the legal field.
Keywords: neo-authoritarianism, constitutional crisis, rule of law, critical jurisprudence, 
populism.
Critical jurisprudence usually portrays the legal universum in dark colours, 
and quite rightly so. Nevertheless, there are times when a yet darker hue of black 
begins to dominate and the cause of freedom begins to lose. For all critical 
thinking – at least the current which harks back to Marx and inherits from the 
Frankfurt School – such historical moments present an uncanny challenge. The 
eye which is well adapted to black might be less inclined to notice that the twilight 
is moving forward surprisingly fast. It is rather liberal jurisprudence that seems 
to take account of slowly progressing tectonic rifts that, once completed, will 
separate us for good (and bad) from the world in which critical jurisprudence 
flourished. Suddenly, what the Crits denounce as a bare play of interests and power 
under the hegemonic and neutralised edifice of positive law is brought to light. 
The liberal disguise begins to lose its mystifying force and the critical discourse 
is confronted with movements or governments that machiavellianly abuse legal 
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instruments. Given that these historical periods are times of great confusion, they 
require – especially from the critical jurisprudence (and, generally speaking, 
all critical approach) a careful calculus of one’s own positions. It is only in this 
manner that divisions between the critique and the criticised may be re-drawn.
This paper is meant to argue that processes of degradation of the rule of 
law, the rise of nationalism and authoritarianism – variously defined and having 
multiple forms – should be viewed as signs of an epochal challenge not only for 
liberal, but also for critical jurisprudence. In Central-Eastern Europe, with its 
own complex legal history, legacy of real socialism, relations of post-colonial 
dependence from the West and impact of turbo-capitalist transition – and, 
most importantly, with most crystal examples of turning to new forms of semi-
authoritarian regimes that might be found within the EU – critical jurisprudence 
must promptly reconsider its own strategies. 
This change comes in a somewhat unfortunate moment, given that critical 
legal studies in this part of Europe only recently began to gain its own voice and 
perspective (Mańko, Cercel, Sulikowski 2016, 1–11). Critical jurisprudence has so 
far focused more on the legacy of real socialism and the (neo-)liberal hegemony 
in post-socialist countries of CEE, simultaneously struggling for recognition in 
the Western academia. Therefore the confrontation with the ongoing authoritarian 
turn might require speedy adaptation processes and developing new intellectual 
tools. Nevertheless, deliberate myopia for the recent events, or even a kind of 
Schadenfreude on the part of the CEE Crits in times of populism would not augur 
well for self-criticism and self-orientation of critical jurisprudence. That the liberal 
opponent has been weakened is obviously an opportunity for better dismantling 
of previously hegemonic ideological veil, but it runs the risk of contributing to the 
right-wing authoritarian assault on values that the critical movement should 
not dispense with, such as personal and civic freedoms, gender and LGBTQ+ 
equality, rights of minorities as well as egalitarianism abstracting from nationality 
or ethnicity. In other words, critical jurisprudence is in dire need of outlining 
a third way – not in the compromised sense connoting the debacle of the left in the 
90s, but understood as a position from which liberal ideological hegemony might 
be criticised on a par with anti-emancipatory populist movements which openly 
rekindle spectres of thick nationalism.
The paper consists of four parts. Firstly, it attempts to outline what the neo-
authoritarian transformation is, especially in the context of CEE on the example 
of Poland and Hungary. Then it proceeds to investigating the strained relationship 
between CEE neo-authoritarianisms and the law. The third part provides a brief 
overview of liberal jurisprudence in its attempts to grasp and criticise neo-
authoritarianism as a practice openly challenging the rule of law. Finally, it aims 
to provide a few orientation points concerning the desired position and tasks of 
the CLS in the context of CEE neo-authoritarianism.
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1. THE NEO-AUTHORITARIAN TURN IN THE CENTRAL-EUROPEAN CONTEXT
The predicament with naming the processes which we are currently 
witnessing is well known and habitually deplored: terms such as “populism”, 
“authoritarianism”, “neo-authoritarianism” or “illiberal democracy” are 
usually used as conventional references (Pech, Scheppele 2017, 4). Given that 
the designates remain more or less the same, the process is not fully intelligible 
(especially in its long-term consequences) and all the names seem somewhat 
trite or worn out, they should be used more as provisional stickers rather than 
ossified naming conventions. Instead of musing on whether “populism” is an 
operationalisable tool or whether “illiberal democracy” is still a democracy, 
I would opt for choosing one of the terms as (at least transiently) more pertinent 
than others: neo-authoritarianism. 
I borrow it from Polish sociologist Maciej Gdula who in his otherwise 
debatable enquiry into the rise of Poland’s far-right government meant to highlight 
that it is supported not (chiefly) because of its pro-social agenda and unblocking 
the previous neo-liberal consensus on a class-biased austerity, but due to the 
component of public revenge on the elites, broadly perceived by some strata of 
Polish society as corrupt, hegemonic and unjust (Gdula 2018). As Gdula argues, 
Poland’s ruling majority produces a spectacle of vengeance and humiliation 
on institutions, authorities and individuals who were anyhow prominent under 
the previous government. Adherents of the far-right coalition may thus identify 
their own perception of injustice or underprivileged status with the Debordian 
spectacle in the public sphere. In this sense, “neo-authoritarianism” grasps well 
the mechanism of mobilising the general disenchantment with globalisation 
and liberal democracy which is channelled into a movement against an enemy 
constructed with far-right imagery. 
Apart from this explanatory power, “neo-authoritarianism” might be 
linked to a few further connotations which can make it a handy conceptual tool 
for analysing the recent developments in CEE: (1) it retains the component of 
authoritarian rule, even if variously squared with elements of Western liberal 
democracy, (2) it underlines a certain continuity of pre-War and post-War right/
far-right politics as centred on coerced unanimity of opinions, normalisation of 
support for the ruling power, arbitrariness, anti-minority rhetoric and policies, 
rekindling nationalism and the foe-friend division, (3) it points to a transformation 
of socio-political context in which this new form of authoritarianism functions, 
(4) it catches the elusive presence of past forms of far-right governments, the one 
which Neil Levi and Michael Rothberg called “the mnemonic flash of fascism” 
(Levi, Rothberg 2018, 356) and, finally, (5) it is undetermined enough to provide 
a working tool for referring to the still unfinished processes.
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Applying this concept to the context of Central-Eastern Europe in order 
to orientate critical jurisprudence requires finding some basic coordinates of this 
region’s specificity. Naturally, CEE neo-authoritarianism, if we settle for this 
term, bears similarities to processes which happen throughout the contemporary 
world with most crystal examples in “trumpism” or Rodrigo Duterte’s rule in the 
Philippines. Western Europe has equally produced analogous movements, led by 
Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands or Matteo Salvini in 
Italy. In the field of political studies, there are already some valuable preliminary 
analyses of the new kinds of populism (Müller 2016, Moffitt 2016, Saward 2010). 
All these phenomena can be understood only with reference to some elementary 
socio-political conditions such as: (1) transformations of the public sphere by the 
Internet and the subsequent democratisation and fragmentation of knowledge 
(which, on the one hand, allow of consolidation of movements on the basis of 
beliefs excluded or non-represented in the official channels of communication, 
and, on the other hand, prevent systematic verification of news, thus contributing 
to spread of conspiracy theories as well as incoherent and ideologically biased 
opinions), (2) post-neoliberal intellectual desert, in which in-depth analysis of the 
current conditions is hampered by most mystifying ideological misrepresentations; 
in a supremely Baudrillardean way, the ideological seems nowadays greatly 
displaced in comparison with actual social relations, making politics be reigned 
by drifting simulacra, (3) the unprecedented historical collapse of the left on many 
levels: intellectual (lack of general theory of world/state justice and absence 
of proper political agenda stemming from it), political (the left is now divided 
between waning social-democratic parties of the old establishment – still too 
strong to disappear, but too weak to hold power and bring about a significant 
change – and new movements, still struggling for self-definition and broader 
recognition) and organisational. Nonetheless, there are some significant factors that 
differentiate neo-authoritarianism in CEE from its Western or global counterparts.
First of all, the most notable difference consists in the fact that unlike Western 
Europe CEE has witnessed the rise of far-right populist movements gaining power 
and establishing governments which in the last few years have undertaken vast 
transformations of the previous liberal regimes. Naturally, the rise of Austrian 
(far-)right-wing majority (comprising the infamous FPÖ party) or the recent 
actions of the Italian Lega are also reminiscent of “illiberal democracies” (and 
might lead to building them in the future), yet it is only in CEE that these neo-
authoritarian regimes are actually constructed (cf. Bugaric, Kuhelj 2018, 22). 
The difference is most visible at the legal level. Both Hungary and Poland, which 
are the basic examples, underwent a significant change in the relation between 
power and law: law is treated at best instrumentally, with permanent attacking 
the bulwarks of the rule of law standards and sometimes, especially in the case of 
Poland, the very applicability of law is dismantled.
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Secondly, CEE democracies even before the neo-authoritarian turn were – in 
liberal terms – classified as “flawed” democracies (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s 2018). The accumulated historical burden of long-term peripherality, real 
socialism and brutal transition to market economy determined the adaptation of 
liberal democracy. Moreover, these countries are marked by relatively high levels 
of nationalism (cf. Bugaric, Kuhelj 2018, 23, 26–27) – with still unworked-through 
legacy of nationalism cultivated by popular democracies. This entanglement 
at least partially accounts for the particular blend of socialist measures and 
chauvinistic rhetoric that marks neo-authoritarian governments in this region. 
The legacy of real socialism and swift transition to neoliberalism also contributed 
to increasing the “post-ideological” desert in these countries. With low levels of 
intellectual culture and lack of competent organic intellectuals (in the Gramscian 
sense), CEE states are particularly prone to ideological misrepresentations with 
conspiracy theories elevated to the rank of officially endorsed beliefs (like George 
Soros’ alleged influences on Hungarian institutions and opposition or Polish myth 
of “communist deposits” who paralyse the country’s development). 
Finally, neo-authoritarianism in CEE must be read in postcolonial context. 
These countries, historically suspended in almost perpetual dependence and, 
worse enough, having some cultural propensities to dependence-centred 
perception of the world, are now once again in the peripheries, this time of the 
EU. In economic terms, they are dependent on the Western core of the Union, 
which is particularly manifest in the relationship between Poland and Germany. 
Dependence reproduces itself on many levels; on the personal plane, many citizens 
of CEE countries (especially of Poland and Romania) have experienced economic 
migration to the West and relative deprivation.
Taking into account this specif ic context of CEE countries, neo-
authoritarianism might be seen as a conceptual tool which is much more 
explanatory in relation to them than to states of Western Europe or non-
European ones. The term accentuates a peculiar blend of continuity and novelty 
which accounts for their current far-right deviations. Unlike Western Europe, 
neo-authoritarianism has two legacies that it draws from (although with only 
implicit references): the experience of socialist autocracy and the practice of non-
negotiable neoliberal governing as a condition of possibility of politics, beyond 
actual representations of the political agon. Critical jurisprudence is usually well 
acquainted with legal weaponry of the latter, whereas long legal and political 
shadow of the former – especially inasmuch as it contributed to producing 
a properly nationalistic imagery of homogenous nations, protected by states 
against external threats – is less recognised. 
If, however, critical jurisprudence is to provide a pertinent and original 
answer to CEE neo-authoritarianism, it needs to undertake a systematic review 
of its origins, practices and ideology in relation to both previous types of 
authoritarianism. As far as the legacy of “technical” authoritarianism of liberal 
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capitalism is concerned, it seems that to all intents and purposes the current 
neo-authoritarian governments in CEE not only have not ruptured with it, but 
continue to use its paradoxical strategy of building “democracy without a choice”. 
Their purportedly socialist measures, especially in Poland (such as the “500+ 
programme”, consisting in benefits for families or introducing a minimum wage 
for workers employed on civil contracts) do not form part of a well-constructed, 
comprehensive and just socialist agenda. They are, moreover, accompanied by 
purely neoliberal practice in pro-capitalist politics. As a result, the class conflict 
is exploited in an extremely misrepresented manner. 
In this regard, the current developments also need to be seen in the light of 
the wane of the language of class struggle under late real socialism and its almost 
absolute evaporation in CEE after the fall of the Iron Curtain. In a displacement 
which bears many affinities with classic manoeuvres of fascism, the class 
struggle has been diverted to construct a chain of equivalence between imaginary 
class enemies (essentially, all the “elites” which do not support the far-right 
governments, especially judicial and cultural ones) and usual scapegoats (Jews 
– although referred to via crypto-anti-Semitic language of understatements and
suggestions – Muslims, refugees and ethnic minorities). Therefore the CEE neo-
authoritarianism must be seen in the light of a massive social misrepresentation of 
the class struggle, centred on authoritarian tendencies and ideology of pure power. 
In this regard, all tools offered by previous dysfunctional liberal democracies 
are used to pursue quite a universal neoliberal agenda under the official guise of 
anti-globalism and anti-Europeanism. It is for this reason that the clash between 
Hungary and Poland and the EU is hardly concentrated on economic matters, but 
on standards of democracy (space for opposition, rule of law, independent judiciary 
etc.) and human rights protection, even though neo-authoritarian governments sap 
energy from class conflict displaced by globalisation.
2. LAW AS A FIELD OF FIGHT
Not unexpectedly, law becomes a crucial field of expansion of neo-
authoritarianism and it is in this area that its clash with broadly conceived 
liberal democracy comes to the fore. Both CEE examples of neo-authoritarian 
governments, the Hungarian and the Polish one, brought about a profound 
transformation of legal systems in both countries, although in each case they 
resorted to different strategies. The Orbán government seized the opportunity 
of gaining constitutional majority (as a result of low demands that the previous 
constitution stipulated for its amendment and a pro-majority electoral rules) and 
openly undertook a systematic overhaul of Hungarian legislation, beginning with 
adopting the new constitution in 2011. The far-right government in Poland did not 
share its ally’s luck and, without constitutional majority, must have taken an even 
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more unsettling path. The combination of gaining sway over key institutions (the 
public prosecution, the Constitutional Court, the National Council of Radio and 
TV, the National Council of the Judiciary and, work still in progress, the Supreme 
Court and common courts) and amending the constitution with sub-constitutional 
laws made it possible to gain direct control over a huge part of state apparatus and 
legal norms.
The two strategies are manifestly different, but mainly in two points. 
Firstly, they differ in their ideological effects. The new Hungarian constitution 
was adopted as a blatant contestation of liberal ideals of democracy; it is based 
on strong nationalistic rhetoric and a vision of the nation as ethnos, not demos. 
Poland, however, is still formally ruled by its 1997 liberal constitution, although 
it became practically inapplicable to a high degree. As a result, the Polish far-
right transformation could not be satisfied with finding its “ultimate expression” 
in an appropriate basic law. The overall direction of this transformation has not 
been sanctified in any legal manifesto, which increases the rift between audacious 
anti-European chauvinist rhetoric of the ruling majority and its down-to-earth 
instrumental approach to the law and the state. Secondly, Hungary preserved 
to a much higher extent the form of legality and the very applicability of the 
opposition “legal/illegal”, whereas Polish legal system in some of its parts becomes 
inoperable, because state institutions may – according to their current political 
affiliation – apply either non-constitutional laws or the Constitution itself. If 
there is no institution which can declare illegality in a legitimate manner (as 
the Constitutional Court in its current formation is unconstitutional itself), the 
opposition legal/illegal loses its positive objectivity. For this reason the current 
legal system in Poland constitutes a real challenge for jurisprudence which needs 
to find better conceptual tools than just sticking to explaining why and in which 
respect the majority’s manoeuvres violate the constitutional legal order. 
Despite these crucial differences between the two CEE neo-authoritarian 
governments, practical effects of their actions are often quite convergent. They 
concentrate on gaining pure, possibly unbridled power, whereas law is at best 
just an instrument to exercise it (cf. Scheppele 2015, 124). Nevertheless, given 
that both countries still formally pledge allegiance to the Western world and the 
EU (even if mingled with anti-European and anti-liberal rhetoric), they seem 
to feel still obliged to maintain the mask of liberal democracies. In this manner, 
they evolve into what Gábor Halmai called “hybrid regimes” (Halmai 2014, 512). 
Formally, they retain the recognisable institutional framework of liberal regimes, 
yet the executive (having dominated the legislative and effectively depoliticising 
it – cf. Ágh 2017, 20) either gained full control over the institutions that ought 
to be independent – thereby making their existence senseless – or marginalised 
them to such a degree that they cannot be of any hamper. The handover of the 
Polish Constitutional Court is a good example of the first strategy, whereas 
the Fourth Amendment to the Hungarian 2011 Constitution – inasmuch as it 
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effectively deprived the Hungarian CC of its institutional memory and continuity 
of interpretation (Halmai 2014, 500–501; Sólyom 2015, 27–30) – proves efficiency 
of the latter.
All in all, the CEE neo-authoritarianism demonstrates a complex approach 
to law, which might be viewed in its short- and long-term consequences, as well 
as depth of interference with the legal system. As far as short-term consequences 
are concerned, both Hungary’s and Poland’s legal systems are field of struggle 
between the liberal and the neo-authoritarian sides. The latter aim to demonstrate 
violations of the Constitution or of international and EU law or their standards, as 
well as to retain as much as possible from the framework of liberal democracy (cf. 
the role of the Polish ombudsman). The former approach the legal system as a field 
that needs to be conquered with intra-legal, extra-legal and preater-legal methods. 
Long-term consequences, however, are more difficult to assess, especially in 
case of Poland. The institutions whose members were appointed illegally already 
act and their decisions will shape legal relationships. Each day the legal chaos is 
increasing, as non-constitutional laws which cannot be declared as such by the 
paralysed CC envisage non-constitutional regulations of institutions (especially 
of courts) which, on their part, adjudicate. Numerous tricks undertaken in Poland 
and Hungary defy the elementary division between legality and illegality: power is 
exercised by non-recognition of valid acts of legal institutions by other institutions 
controlled by the ruling majorities. In this respect the very coherence of the legal 
system is undermined. Moreover, as in past historical examples (it is enough 
to remind oneself of Hitler’s obsessive attacks on lawyers and jurisprudence 
– Broszat 1969, 130ff), the law in itself is presented as an obstacle than prevents
the almost total imaginary overlap between the will of the people, as represented 
by populist governments, and the state machinery. This rhetoric profoundly affects 
the social perception and ideology of the legal field. It seems clear now that even in 
the case of quite improbable return of liberal forces the legacy of neo-authoritarian 
manoeuvres will last long.
As far as short-term consequences are concerned, liberal jurisprudence 
has done a lot of good work in raising awareness about the ongoing changes. 
Nevertheless, it seems quite unprepared to grasp their deep effects on legal 
systems, legal culture and the interface between the political and the legal in neo-
authoritarian CEE countries.
3. LIBERAL JURISPRUDENCE AGAINST NEO-AUTHORITARIAN ILLEGALITY
Even if with somewhat lingering at the beginning, liberal jurisprudence – not 
only from CEE, but from Western Europe and the US as well – is now in full 
swing in denouncing the transformations in Hungary and Poland. The literature 
on the topic is already quite vast. Given that this article does not aim to describe 
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the ongoing debate in full detail, it must be enough to observe a few major trends 
in how CEE neo-authoritarianism is analysed.
First of all, perhaps since the establishment of the liberal consensus after the 
fall of the Iron Curtain liberal jurisprudence has not known such an irruption of 
the political into the legal as it witnesses now (cf. Palombella 2018, 8). Nolens 
volens the analysis of neo-authoritarianism in the legal field calls into question 
the uneasy relationship between the legal and the political, so even if the latter is 
sometimes filtered through a rather unsophisticated conceptual grid (with a notable 
overuse of the concept of populism), it is seen as an unobvious underlining of law 
which no longer can be contained by constitutional rules.
Unsurprisingly, the notion which guides a vast majority of analyses is the 
concept of the rule of law. Applied against the background of the challenge that 
CEE neo-authoritarianism presents to it, it seems to best capture the surface of the 
liberal/anti-liberal rift. The upsurge of anti-liberal rhetoric and measures gave an 
impulse for re-considering what the rule of law means today. Some commentators 
are aware of the paradox that liberal nation-state necessarily produces: radical 
democratic demand might lead to “democraduras” if not curbed by the rule of law 
(Palombella 2018, 9–10). In this line, the rule of law should be viewed rather as 
“the way legality is organised by also allowing a side of positive law capable of 
a contrasting and resisting autonomy vis-à-vis the laws issued by those in power” 
(Palombella 2018, 10). Usual ideals of non-arbitrariness and Fullerian demand of 
predictability are also invoked, which seems of high pertinence in times when 
the Polish and Hungarian governments might almost overnight change each law 
against any standard of continuity and envisageability. 
Nevertheless, the rule of law is seldom investigated at its conceptual roots 
(Pech, Scheppele 2017, 9–10). Only Gianluigi Palombella overcomes the simplistic 
view of the EU’s defence of the rule of law, demonstrating that the EU’s account in 
this regard is not that favourable, whereas the crisis it faces calls into question the 
very relationship between the will of the people and law generation (Palombella 
2018, 15–17). Commentators notice how the rule of law – enmeshed in a thick 
web of international and EU law and cooperation between different levels of 
governance – is being openly contested in the name of national sovereignty (Ágh 
2017, 25; Halmai 2014, 510). In this respect, liberal commentators abstract from 
a notoriously paradoxical nexus between national sovereignty and international 
law, settling for noticing that neo-authoritarian regimes blatantly contest the 
former in the name of the latter.
The notion of populism is a usual key to explaining relationship between the 
political and the legal. The two decades between 1990 and 2010, in themselves 
uneasy for standards of liberal democracy in CEE, are now deplored as times of 
“mild populism” (Ágh 2017, 8, 17) which did not undermine the very ideological 
framework of what is politically desirable. Even if some sins were committed, 
the Big Other was never challenged. Now, however, populism seems to attack the 
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very roots of modern liberal states. As to the causes of the current predicament, 
the socio-economic ground is usually acknowledged, often without much further 
enquiry, with scarce notable exceptions (Ágh 2017, 8ff). Rise of nationalism and 
identity politics is also observed (Ágh 2017, 9). Quite often commentators refer 
to the transformation of the public sphere under the influence of new forms of 
communication (Ágh 2017, 9).
As far as CEE countries are concerned, commentators often notice superficial 
adoption of Western standards in the aftermath of 1989. The cultural and 
civilisational aspect of flawed democratisation (or Europeanisation) seems to come 
to the fore (Halmai 2014, 513). Attila Ágh presents the pre-neo-authoritarian era 
in CEE as times of reciprocal mimicry between CEE countries and the EU: the 
former dressed up their “historical deficits” in garb of successful progress with 
only tiny glitches, whereas the latter took their declarations at face value without 
offering an adequate response to their civilisational backwardness (Ágh 2017, 
 13–14, 16–17). As a result, the marriage between the EU and CEE countries seems 
a rather unmatched one, with both sides culturally unprepared for each other. 
CEE countries are perceived as lacking “democratic resilience” (Ágh 2017, 18). 
Such a state might be even contributed to by the EU as long as local autocrats are 
allies of political parties at the EU level (Kelemen 2017, 231). Mass support for the 
Hungarian Fidesz or the Polish Law and Justice – unabating despite international 
criticism – are a major source of concern, presented sometimes as an inexplicable 
misery that might augur a permanent decline of liberal democracy in CEE 
(cf. Oliver, Stefanelli 2016, 1080; Palombella 2018, 6).
Weaknesses of the EU are a subject in itself. Its legitimacy is now perceived 
as heavily burdened by inadequate responses to the economic crisis, bureaucratic 
isolation, lack of direct democratic control over its institutions (especially in 
comparison with the populist short circuit between imaginary people’s will and 
its exercise over state apparatus) as well as a clear pro-market bias (Ágh 2017, 
10–12; Pinelli 2011, 15). According to some voices, integration through law 
– a naked emperor whose symbolic clothes were for long venerated as a peaceful
and “apolitical” method of building the Union – has now been revealed in the 
form of populist backlash it sparked off by its elitist and undemocratic character 
(Scharpf 2015). On the other hand, lack of advancements in integration is also 
criticised for contributing to neo-authoritarianism. As R. Daniel Kelemen put it, 
the EU constitutes now “an «authoritarian equilibrium», with just enough partisan 
politics at the EU level to coddle local autocrats, but not enough to topple them” 
(Kelemen 2017, 214). Some commentators engage in unmasking the effective state 
of exception which in the crisis years was practiced in the EU governance and can 
no longer be tacitly accepted under the guise of normalcy of integration (Joerges, 
Kreuder‐Sonnen 2017, 121, 127).
Liberal commentators often severely criticise the EU for its paralysis 
before the Medusa gaze of neo-authoritarianism. They point to its indecision, 
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counter-productive measures, lingering and lack of adequate legal tools against 
anti-liberal populism (Pech and Scheppele 2017, 13–24, 28–34; Ágh 2017, 21–25). 
Reluctance to re-adapt available legal devices and inefficiency in the EC’s actions 
are also noted (Oliver and Stefanelli 2016, 1076–1080; Kelemen 2017, 225). Some 
commentators point to the fact that violating the rule of law coupled with the 
principle of mutual trust in the EU might entail problems also for countries not 
affected by neo-authoritarianism (Bonelli 2018, 49–53; Pech and Scheppele 2017, 
7, 11).
As far as answers to the current predicament are concerned, the opinions are 
divergent and rather pessimistic. Some authors engage in conceiving effective 
legal devices of EU law that could curb neo-authoritarian governments – from the 
famous Heidelberg “reverse Solange” proposal, through budget pressure (Pech, 
Scheppele 2017, 45) up to Scheppele’s “systemic infringement procedure” (Bonelli 
2018, 57–63; Pech, Scheppele 2017, 35–38). Others perceive them as hardly feasible 
and suggest modest focusing on the already functioning institutions, mainly 
on Art. 7 TEU (Pech, Scheppele 2017, 7; Bonelli 2018, 63–65), or call for actions 
of liberal Member States (Pech, Scheppele 2017, 26).
All in all, since a long time, if ever, liberal jurisprudence – especially in 
the field of European studies – has not been confronted with such a challenge. 
The liberal compromise has been clearly shattered: the debris of its fall keep 
spreading and cannot be ignored by the doctrine of EU law. Its entanglement in 
all-too-easy eulogy for integration regardless of the means used has already drawn 
substantiated criticism (Joerges, Kreuder‐Sonnen 2017, 120–138). Nevertheless, 
liberal analyses of neo-authoritarianism – despite the sophistication of some 
of them – often have a few lacunas which need to be confronted by critical 
jurisprudence.
4. NEO-AUTHORITARIANISM AND CRITICAL JURISPRUDENCE
Critical jurisprudence in Europe and especially in CEE is now confronted 
with a challenge of probably epochal character. On the one hand, it is itself put 
in an uneasy position: in a sense, it sees it dream coming true in a perversely 
warped way. Neo-authoritarian governments bring back the dimension of the 
political and very often use the rhetoric that harks back to critical approaches 
to liberal ideology of apolitical rule of law. It was well visible in the case of the 
Polish CC, which was attacked quite along the lines of previous critical analyses 
(cf. Sulikowski 2012), although to instrumental reasons. Yet just as fascism 
might be read as a perverted emancipatory struggle, so does this critique has 
no goals that the Crits aspire to. Nevertheless, the CLS must clearly draw the 
line between its approach and the manipulative, rightist and nationalist misuse 
of its heritage. It is not easy to find the correct side of the antagonism, but in 
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my opinion no alliance with neo-authoritarianism is a boundary condition for all 
sensible critique. I would argue that in this struggle the Crits must recognise that 
they belong to the camp of the Enlightenment, together with liberals. At the same 
time, all kinds of collusion between neo-authoritarianisms and the liberal side 
should be vigorously denounced. We can see it clearly in the case of the EU: the 
unholy alliance between neo-authoritarian governments and EU establishment (the 
EPP–Fidesz cooperation, ritual “dialogue” carried out by the EC, tacit sympathy of 
some governments, i.e. Austrian and Italian ones, for CEE neo-authoritarianisms) 
is a cause of worry even for liberal doctrine; all the more vehemently should it 
be decried by the CLS. From the part of academia, liberal normalisation of neo-
authoritarianism or even granting to its inventions a place in the European legal 
area requires polemical response.
In the field of jurisprudence the ossified liberal consensus seems to crumble 
and debate has been opened. As the two sides are now well entrenched in their 
camps, the voice of the left – always the uneasy third party – is hardly hearable. 
The CLS in CEE is relatively new, still occupied with ensconcing itself in the 
academic milieu and re-appropriating conclusions of earlier Western debates. 
Nonetheless, direct intervention in the current struggles within the field of 
jurisprudence is nowadays acutely needed. Neo-authoritarianism will not be 
conquered by eulogising the rule of law and denouncing its dismantlement. Critical 
jurisprudence needs to bring in its own apparatus, supplementing those areas in 
which liberal doctrine remains mute.
What are they? The above-mentioned review of literature demonstrated that 
mainstream jurisprudence is already able to open the debate of the relationship 
between the legal and the political or to reconsider – at least to a certain extent 
– the pernicious effects of previously hegemonic uncritical approach to liberal
dogmas. It is, however, much worse at seven main intellectual and practical 
challenges: (1) re-evaluating the causes of neo-authoritarianism beyond the scheme 
of assault on liberal democracy by demagogues exploiting uneducated masses, 
(2) understanding continuity between neo-authoritarianism and earlier forms of 
monopolised power, such as nationalist stages of real socialism regimes and early 
liberal technocratic governments, (3) analysing in-depth long-term effects of neo-
authoritarian changes, (4) reassessing the fundamental values of the legal system, 
such as predictability, reasonability and certainty in order to save them from the 
crumbling liberal dogma, (5) reinventing ways out of the crisis, (6) redesigning 
the new legal foundations of democracy, which would be both non-exclusive and 
resilient to far-right handover and finally (7) reinventing the very construction of 
EU law – and new models of integration – which would be able both to adequately 
address the challenge of right-wing populism and take responsibility for social 
costs engendered by capitalism (see Azmanova 2013, 33–34).
The most crystal example of conceptual framework that the CLS could bring 
into the current debate is the post-Agambenian notion of the state of exception. It is 
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more than ever adaptable to explaining hybrid regimes which construct autocracy 
in the garb of allegedly democratic forms. In the case of Poland, which is more 
conceptually challenging, it might be the principal conceptual tool to describe 
how the hitherto coherent legal system composed of acts and institutions that 
recognised themselves mutually was disrupted by refusals to recognise the validity 
of norms or acts by executive-controlled institutions. The relationship between the 
legal system and its outside, re-absorbed into play by neo-authoritarianism, needs 
to be portrayed adequately with the concept of the state of exception.
5. CONCLUSIONS: THE URGENT NEED FOR CLS
In analysing the current wave of neo-authoritarianism liberal jurisprudence 
cannot reach the necessary depth: the conceptual framework that the CLS might 
elaborate is acutely needed. Contrary to what might appear at first glance, the CEE 
neo-authoritarianisms do not tend towards suspending the law in order to exercise 
pure power (which is how Nicos Poulatzas interpreted fascism – cf. Poulantzas 
1979, 322), but rather produce complex hybrid regimes which intermingle norms of 
different origin (supranational and national) with a grid of exceptions clouding the 
power of the executive. In this sense, they are a direct continuation of technocratic 
liberal democracies, developing their façade techniques of governance. That 
neo-authoritarian countries might still be functioning members of the EU points 
to a critical short circuit between the liberal blank point and the new far-right 
governmentality. 
On the conceptual level, I argue, the CLS should therefore directly and 
urgently engage in analysing the ongoing change in CEE jurisprudence. On the 
political level, however, it should join the liberal side in defending fundamental 
values and post-Enlightenment legacy in a kind of tactical popular front. 
Nonetheless, it can never lose from its sight the opportunities created by the 
irruption of the political into the field of mainstream jurisprudence.
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